



8 May 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State

Honorable Clark M. Clifford  
The Secretary of Defense

Honorable Richard Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence

General Maxwell D. Taylor  
Chairman, President's Foreign  
Intelligence Advisory Board

At the request of Mr. Fredrick M. Eaton, Chairman of the Special Study Group, I am forwarding for your information a copy of a draft containing the preliminary conclusions and recommendations of the Study Group.

Copies of this report are being forwarded for comment to the persons listed in the attachment. Mr. Eaton wished me to emphasize that this report has not heretofore been presented to or cleared with the Staff of the Special Study Group or any department or agency of the Government.

Richard Collins  
Maj. Gen. USA - Ret.  
Staff Director

Attachments  
NSA, DIA, NRO reviews completed

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The Honorable Paul H. Nitze  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

*Comments requested -*

The Honorable Charles J. Zwick  
Director, Bureau of the Budget

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Harold K. Johnson, USA  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer  
Chief of Naval Operations

General John P. McConnell, USAF  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF  
Director of Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. General Marshall S. Carter, USA  
Director, National Security Agency

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes  
Director of Intelligence & Research  
The Department of State

The Honorable Alexander Flax  
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force  
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Major General Charles J. Denholm  
Commanding General  
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Commanding General  
U.S. Air Force Security Service

Captain Ralph E. Cook  
Director, Naval Security Group

Members of the Staff of the Special Study Group

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TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT

This draft represents tentative conclusions of the Study Group based upon an analysis of many papers produced on numerous SIGINT subjects, many interviews and a limited number of on-site inspections.

It has not been submitted to or staffed out by the men assigned to the Group from the several departments and agencies who have been of the greatest assistance to it.

This draft should not be considered a final report but a statement of the tentative conclusions of the Study Group submitted to evoke comment from the numerous agencies involved in the SIGINT effort.

FREDERICK M. EATON

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~~TOP SECRET~~Copy No. 20Tentative Draft Report  
8 May 1968GENERAL COMMENTS

1. In its review of the US COMINT and ELINT effort, the Special Study Group has found the intelligence community generally satisfied with the technical competence of its people, the maintenance and modernization of its facilities, and the quality of its product and dissemination thereof.

2. A re-evaluation of the SIGINT effort is appropriate in the light of the developments during the 15 years which have intervened since the last major study--particularly in the ELINT area. The vast increase in the signals subject to interception and their sophistication; the rapid advance in technology for interception from ground, air, sea and space; the new geographic areas of interest to the intelligence community--all have given rise to new problems in the programming of requirements and the provision of a technical base to meet them, now and for the foreseeable future.

3. The findings and recommendations in this report should be considered against this background--not as a criticism of things past, but rather as a summary of the inevitable difficulties which have

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arisen by reason of the rapid expansion of the dimension of the effort.

4. The Special Study Group, therefore, asks that this report be considered in this light, as a constructive evaluation objectively pointing in the direction of a more productive and more efficient system.

#### I. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMMING AND GUIDANCE

1. The Special Study Group found a critical lack in the basic direction of the intelligence community in the absence of an agreed statement of essential national intelligence purposes and objectives around which a national intelligence program could be built. The intelligence community, at all stages of its work from collection to finished intelligence, seems to follow an implicit but variable sense of what is important. At no point, however, have the basic guides for intelligence activities been set down as a touchstone for the validity or emphasis to be accorded an intelligence undertaking. The Special Study Group believes that the DCI, who has the responsibility for overall coordination of US intelligence activities, should translate the main directions and needs of national policy into the purposes, targets and priorities of intelligence activities and define broad roles in meeting these goals for each of the major programs and processes of the intelligence community.

Program Guidance

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2. Within the outlines of such a national intelligence program, relatively permanent in character, periodic guidance for programming can be developed as more specific tasks and objectives for intelligence activities, particularly for the main collection programs, the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP) and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and the CIA Program. These guides should provide a clearer basis for decisions on allocating resources, both for the near-term and for a five-year projection ahead. This should be the guidance which determines the size of the "technical base" in COMINT and ELINT on a given problem or area--the level of effort required to maintain the ability to deal with present and potential targets. This accounts for much the greatest part of COMINT and ELINT resources. Present guidance, the Special Study Group found, generally takes the form of quite specific and detailed statements of information needs; they can guide what should be reported but have little, if any, application to the technical base. If guidance is to influence resource levels and distribution, it must deal with and alter the technical base, not the relatively minor fraction of resources involved in reporting.

3. The programming guidance should also serve as a base for assessing the potential contributions to a given problem or on a given area which can be expected from photography, [ ] overt sources

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and open literature, as well as from COMINT, Telemetry and ELINT, and should guide trade-offs among those collection programs. Similarly, it should establish an outline against which to measure the costs of the effort on a given subject, distributed among sources, and should help to identify where savings can be made and where the risks of resource reductions might be great or small.

#### Evaluation

4. The precision, relevance and usefulness of this guidance would be increased materially if it were based in turn on the results of better evaluation procedures to gauge what has been done and how well under existing guidance. The Special Study Group has found that present evaluations, which mainly deal with what has been reported over a given period, are inadequate for assisting guidance on resource allocations. No attempt is made to relate information obtained to the resources or sources which produced it; no means exist to measure the value of that information against the costs of acquiring it; and no relationship is drawn between the product and the size of the technical base which underlies it. Perceptive evaluations of what a given array of resources yielded seem to us essential for determining what changes in those resources are required.

5. We believe the DCI, with the advice, but not necessarily the concurrence of USIB, should take prompt action to develop a broad national intelligence program, more specific guidance for programming

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stemming from it and a better means to evaluate the effect of that guidance on a given set of resources. These steps are essential, it seems to us, if the intelligence community is to deal effectively with a period of growing stringency of resources and a corresponding need for hard management decisions.

## II. RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

1. There seems to be a considerable lack of coordination within the Department of Defense, which controls the largest amount of intelligence collection resources, on program formulation, review, decision and allocation. In the day-to-day management of these allocated resources, there seems to be a further lack of coordination and cross-telling; individual programs seem to proceed on their own, with little management reckoning of what each has accomplished and how each could buttress, relieve or replace the other. The management of intelligence resources cannot be made properly on the basis of separating budgets according to individual collection systems without a serious attempt to coordinate these separate programs. We see the allocation of resources to COMINT and ELINT with little reference to other types of collection. We believe the risks of eliminating or reducing a collection effort should be determined on the basis of the totality of effort applied to each target.

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In the Department of Defense

2. The Special Study Group has considered and rejected suggestions for a different location in government for the NSA than its present position in the Department of Defense. We believe such a move would create more problems than it would solve and that the designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the US Government for COMINT and ELINT remains valid. The Special Study Group further believes that control over US COMINT and ELINT programs within the Department of Defense should be centralized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary or a new position of an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Management, if one is created. (Hereafter, when we speak of the Secretary of Defense, we include as alternates the Deputy Secretary or this new position.) The Secretary in addition should exercise similar program control over the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and should have before him the CIA Program so as to take account of the tasks and resources CIA is putting on the same targets and problems. This arrangement would go far to ensure close coordination and trade-off among these large programs, a relationship we observe is lacking at present.

3. Within the broad program authority vested in the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent, the Special Study Group believes that control and direction of Defense Department COMINT and ELINT

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activities should be centralized, but in separate organizations. At present, both COMINT and ELINT activities are being controlled and carried on by a number of organizations, often quite independently. The Special Study Group believes that the differences between COMINT and ELINT outweigh their similarities and that central control of all COMINT activities by NSA and of all ELINT activities by DIA will reduce inefficiencies and disputes over authorities and resources. The responsibility for Telemetry would remain with NSA.

#### COMINT vs. ELINT

4. For these purposes, COMINT is defined as the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means and the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Telemetry is the interception of signals carrying measurements of the performance of a weapon, person or other system. ELINT is the collection and processing of information from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic or radio-active sources. Electronic warfare consists of collection, analysis and reaction--the reaction taking the form of jamming, deception, avoidance or attack. Analysis here is a process to which collected data must be subjected to permit reaction to be carried out and does not require further reference to an intelligence data base.

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5. COMINT is now all but entirely within the scope of NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA's); ELINT is dispersed among DIA, NRO, CIA, the SCA's and the Unified and Specified Commands, notably SAC. COMINT resources are almost completely contained in the CCP; ELINT resources are found in the CCP, but ten times more are in the CIP of DIA, the National Reconnaissance Program of the NRO and in the CIA Program. COMINT processing is concentrated in NSA; ELINT processing is carried on by NSA and by all the organizations involved in its collection.

6. COMINT deals with information-carrying communications, hence the association of Telemetry with it; ELINT deals with the characteristics, location and relation to [ ] activity of a specific signal. COMINT needs long periods of intercept; ELINT needs only a brief segment of signal activity. COMINT and ELINT collection and processing differ as to missions, equipment, skills, procedures, reporting and timeliness--and even security protection. COMINT deals with a broad range of substance, [ ] ELINT is primarily [ ] the identification, location and description of radars and other emitters--the externals of a signal, not the information it contains. COMINT is of interest and importance to all forms of intelligence; ELINT only to [ ] [ ] and to technical intelligence on enemy electronics.

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7. The Special Study Group believes that these differences warrant separate organizations for COMINT and ELINT and that the predominantly [ ] character of ELINT warrants its assignment to DIA.

8. Both the Director of NSA and the Director of DIA should be delegated management authority and operational and technical control over COMINT and ELINT entities respectively as executive agents of the Secretary of Defense. This authority should be clearly and forcefully affirmed and its exercise given the fullest support by the Secretary of Defense. Both Directors should report to the Secretary of Defense directly, with no other authorities intervening, on matters concerned with the management and direction of their respective fields. Command of the many existing entities should remain in the Services.

COMINT in NSA

9. In consolidating NSA's control over COMINT, the authority of the Director over the Service Cryptological Agencies must be restored to the degree intended in the original directive establishing NSA. In the years since 1952, the lines of authority of NSA have been blurred; the SCA's are under command control and budgetary authority of their parent Services and carry on a number of COMINT and ELINT-related activities for their Services quite outside NSA's authority. Directives to the SCA's from the Services frequently ignore NSA or require only the loosest kind of coordination with it. The failure of NSA to use vigorously the authority it has been formally delegated has led to a lack of confidence in NSA, which in turn has aggravated the trend toward eroding NSA's central control.

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10. The tactical needs of the theater commanders and their direct levies on the SCA's occasionally divert away from NSA control varying amounts of SCA COMINT resources. A lack of confidence in NSA and in communications with NSA in time of crisis, together with a natural wish to control resources needed for battle, have led theater commanders to increase pressures for direct control over some COMINT resources rather than let NSA direct them in support of the commands. These tendencies have led to an erosion of NSA's authority and to a dispersion of the unified control over COMINT intended in the original directive.

11. The Special Study Group strongly recommends that the authority of the Director, NSA, over all COMINT activities within the Department of Defense be confirmed in a clear and unequivocal directive and that derivative directives to the SCA's and to their subordinate elements reflect the primacy of NSA's control. NSA, freed of the responsibility for ELINT and the need to resist military pressures for ELINT resources, could then concentrate on COMINT, which it does best, and make this central control meaningful and effective.

ELINT in DIA

12. The Special Study Group likewise believes that the authority of the Director, DIA, over all ELINT activities in the Department of

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Defense should be given the same force and effect as for the Director, NSA, over COMINT. The consolidation of ELINT in DIA should reduce troublesome disputes between NSA and the military over resources which are identifiable as either ELINT or Electronic Warfare, depending on the wording of the definitions used. To the degree that ELINT is required in support of Electronic Warfare, a consolidation of the two functions in the military could improve the operation of both. Since ELINT is a good part of the direct support resources needed by theater commanders, transfer of ELINT control to DIA could remove one source of friction between NSA and the Unified and Specified Commands. Residual differences between DIA and the theater commands and SAC would be less likely with ELINT in DIA and more readily resolved.

13. The dual control of the SCA's by NSA and DIA would not pose a major problem if the clear authorities of NSA and DIA are established as for different SCA activities. The superficial appearance of fractionation in having two authorities over what was once considered a single function is dispelled by the fact that the unity of ELINT and COMINT under the term SIGINT was never a reality and that NSA's control over ELINT never really operated. In the absence of effective NSA control, a number of authorities have moved into the vacuum and divided ELINT into many pieces. These separate and often independent

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operations in the ELINT area would be put back together under DIA with considerable gains in economy and efficiency.

14. With regard to COMINT and ELINT activities carried on by the NRO, the Special Study Group has found a further blurring of lines of authority and considerable lack of understanding at all levels between NRO and NSA, which has responsibility for processing the material obtained by NRO. While measures to reduce this gap are finding some success, the Special Study Group believes that NSA's technical control in COMINT satellites and DIA's technical control in ELINT satellites need to be recognized. [redacted] should remain with NRO, which should be encouraged to take full advantage of the technical competence in NSA, DIA and CIA in the field of COMINT and ELINT collection by satellites. [redacted]

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#### Resource Decisions

15. The Special Study Group assumes that programming for ELINT under DIA would be consolidated in the CIP where most ELINT resources are carried now, and that the CCP would continue to carry all Defense COMINT resources. We recommend that a single review of all COMINT and ELINT programs in the Department of Defense be held under a single authority. The review should encompass resource allocations and proposals for both the CCP and CIP and those parts of the CIA Program and the NRP which are related to COMINT and ELINT

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activities--the latter as "add-on" items--to ensure that gaps, redundancies, and trade-offs among the programs are clearly visible and the allocations of resources to various targets can be identified and compared. The review authority should be the Secretary of Defense, as the common reporting point for the three Defense intelligence programs. He would be assisted in the determination of these choices by the officials responsible for executing them--the Directors of NSA and DIA--and by an inter-departmental group, as at present, from State, CIA, DIA/JCS, Budget and concerned elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

16. The foregoing would remedy much of the lack of coordination within the Department of Defense. The role of the intelligence community, and specifically that of the DCI and the Secretary of State, would be strengthened by the creation of an Intelligence Resources Board as an extension of the present ExCom (Executive Committee) of the NRO. The Special Study Group, noting that both the DCI and the Secretary of State are affected by material changes in resource levels on given targets, believes that both officials should take a greater part in resource decisions. The Intelligence Resources Board should be composed of the Secretary of Defense as Chairman, the

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Secretary of State and the DCI, with the Director of the Budget sitting in as a non-voting observer. The Board would comment on all major changes in all intelligence resources programs in the light of approved national intelligence guidance, evaluations and consequent recommended resource revisions, including those assigned to the COMINT technical base. Such a Board would be the most authoritative source for the hard decisions to come as intelligence resources are reduced or rearranged or to meet rising costs, expanding needs, tighter restrictions and growing complexities. The risks of doing without certain information, eliminating certain efforts, consolidating certain facilities and organizations and concentrating on certain source or resource leads require judgments of a Board at this high level.

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